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The introduction of workmen's compensation legislation was
an innovation in the law of master and servant. Scarcely less
striking than its effects in its own field was its unanticipated
influence within the field of admiralty. The passage of legisla-
tion of this type by the states led to a new and far-reaching de-
velopment of the doctrine of uniformity in the maritime law of
the United States. The need of uniformity was invoked in
order to deny the application of the state statutes to maritime
injuries, and in protecting the sea law from contamination by
these new notions an utter rout was inflicted upon the adherents
of the common law in the centuries-old conflict between the com-
mon law and admiralty. Since the first leading decision in
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen," state workmen's compensation
acts, along with the rest of state law, have had only a very
limited application within the maritime field. The merits and
demerits of the Jensen case have been so much discussed that
further extended comment upon it is uncalled for.2 But other
difficulties remained. It became necessary to determine the
powers of Congress with respect to uniformity, and to determine
just where the line of demarcation should be drawn between
federal and state authority. Since these difficulties have related
largely to workmen's compensation, a discussion of the applica-
bility of such relief to maritime injuries seems timely. To
trace the development of this subject since Southern Pacific Co.
v. Jensen will be the purpose of this article.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF UNIFORMITY
In order to supply the necessary background for the later cases
it will be necessary to review the growth of the doctrine of uni-
formity, passing briefly over all but the developments of the last
decade. The principle derives its existence from Section 2 of
'244 U. S. 205, 37 Sup. Ct. 524 (1917).
2 Wright, Uniformity in the Maritime Law of the United States (1925)
73 U. of PA. L. REV. 123, 223; Fell, Recent Problems in Admiralty Juris-
diction (1922) 40 JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY STUDIES 287; Dodd, The New
Doctrine of the Supremacy of Admiralty over the Common Law (1921)
21 COL. L. REV. 647; Palfrey, The Common Law Courts and the Law of
the Sea (1923) 36 HARv. L. REV. 777; Cunningham, Is Every County Court
in the United States a Court of Admiralty? (1919) 53 Aimx. L. REv. 749;
Cunningham, The Tables Turned-Lord Coke Demolished (1921) 55 AM.
L. REV. 685.
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Article III of the federal Constitution, by which the judicial
power is extended "to all cases of admiralty and maritime juris-
diction." Upon this scanty foundation a doctrine of far-redching
scope has been erected. In the beginning little or no attention
seems to have been paid to the matter of uniformity or even
to the nature of the substantive admiralty law. At an early
date it was settled that the familiar system of "general maritime
law" was to be applied in the admiralty courts. In the course
of time it also became established that a general legislative power
over the maritime law was impliedly vested in Congress by the
Constitution.
However, the maritime jurisdiction thus granted to the federal
government was never wholly exclusive of state authority, which
was made effective in two ways. In the first place the courts
of common law continued to exercise, as they had before, a juris-
diction in maritime cases concurrent with that of the admiralty
courts. Whether or not this concurrent jurisdiction would have
survived in the absence of federal legislation, it was at once
sanctioned by Congress through the so-called saving clause in
the original Judiciary Act of 1789.3 This clause conferred upon
the federal district courts "exclusive original cognizance of all
civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.. . saving
to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common-law remedy, where
the common law is competent to give it."
Secondly, even in the courts of admiralty some cases were de-
cided in accordance with state law and not under the general
maritime law. Familiar illustrations are state statutes regulat-
ing pilotage, death acts and acts giving a maritime, lien upon
a vessel for repairs or supplies furnished in her home port.
These state laws were resorted to where the maritime law seemed
inadequate, without inquiry as to the general status of such di-
verse elements in the admiralty. But the inquiry could not long
be delayed and it resulted in the formulation of the first of three
major stages of development through which the doctrine of uni-
formity has passed, namely, the uniformity of the system of law
applicable in the admiralty courts in the absence of congressional
legislation. Were divergent local laws to be the exception or the
rule? To this question the natural answer was made that a uni-
form system of federal maritime law must be dominant; resort
to state law on certain subjects, recognized to be usually local in
character, was accepted more as a matter of precedent than of
principle. The leading statement of these conclusions was made
3 1 STAT. 73, 76, 77 (17S9).
- See examples enumerated in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jonson, supra note
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by the Supreme Court in 1875 in The Lottawanna, where Justice
Bradley said: r
"That we have a maritime law of our own, operative through-
out the United States, cannot be doubted. The general system of
maritime law which was familiar to the lawyers and statesmen
of the country when the Constitution was adopted, was most
certainly intended and referred to when it was declared in that
instrument that the judicial power of the United States shall
extend 'to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.' But
by what criterion are we to ascertain the precise limits of the
law thus adopted? The Constitution does not define it. .
"One thing, however, is unquestionable; the Constitution must
have referred to a system of law coextensive with, and operating
uniformly in, the whole country. It certainly could not have been
the intention to place the rules and limits of maritime law under
the disposal *and regulation of the several states, as that would
have defeated the uniformity and consistency at which the Con-
stitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial character affect-
ing the intercourse of the States with each other or with foreign
states."
The next major development in the uniformity of the sub-
stantive maritime law was not reached until 1917, when South-
ern Pacific Co. v. Jensen was decided. A stevedore had been
killed in New York harbor in the course of his maritime employ-
ment on board a vessel owned by a Kentucky corporation. An
award was made to his widow under the New York worknen's
compensation act and upheld by the state courts. The case
thus differed from The Lottawannt in the important particular
that it arose in the state tribunals instead of in admiralty. The
Supreme Court of the United States, by a five-to-four vote, never-
theless reversed the judgment of the New York Court of Appeals
on the ground that, as so applied, the compensation statute was
in conflict with the federal Constitution. In so doing it laid
down for the first time the broad constitutional doctrine that not
only must uniformity be dominant in admiralty, but also the
same body of maritime law must be applied by state tribunals in
such maritime controversies as may come before them in the
1, at 216, 246-247, 37 Sup. Ct. at 529, 541-542; also in The City of Norwalk,
55 Fed. 98, 106-107 (S. D. N. Y. 1893).
21 Wall. 558, 574 (U. S. 1874).
An alternative ground given for the decision was that the remedy which
the compensation statute attempts to give is of a character wholly unknown
to the common law, incapable of enforcement by the ordinary processes of
any court and hence not a "common-law remedy" within the scope of the
saving clause which defines the concurrent jurisdiction of the state tri-
bunals. This, however, seems inconsistent with the position taken by the
Court in the later case of Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 T1. S.
109, 44 Sup. Ct. 274 (1924). It is there said that the right of a common-
law remedy saved to suitors includes "all means other than proceedings in
admiralty which may be employed to enforce the right or to redress the in-
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exercise of their concurrent jurisdiction." Even so it did not
necessarily follow that the state act could not govern. For, as
previously stated, local law is given effect in certain cases even
in admiralty, and would be equally applicable in a common
law court. This was of course recognized by the Supreme Court,
which attempted to specify more closely than it had theretofore
done the limits beyond which state legislation may not go. It
said: 7
"And plainly, we think, no such legislation is valid if it con-
travenes the essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress
or works material prejudice to the characteristic features of
the general maritime law or interferes with the proper harmony
and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate
relations. This limitation, at the least, is essential to the effec-
tive operation of the fundamental purposes for which such law
was incorporated into our national laws by the Constitution it-
self. "
Applying this test to the controversy in question, it was held
that the matters involved were of general rather than local con-
cern, and that the necessary consequence of the application of
the compensation statute would be destruction of the very uni-
formity in respect to maritime matters which the Constitution
was designed to establish. The rights of the parties were thus
dependent solely upon the maritime law.
The result of the Jensen decision is that, so far as substantive
rights are concerned, it makes no difference whether a suitor
brings his action in admiralty or -in a common-law tribunal under
the saving clause. Any departure by a state court from the
maritime rules approved by the United States Supreme Court
will be reversible upon review by the latter. It is this phase of
the whole uniformity doctrine that has been the principal sub-
ject of controversy. Hostile criticism, which has been extensive,
has been based largely upon the ground that there was no suffi-
cient authority or precedent to justify the imposition of maritime
law upon common-law courts. The Constitution of course has
nothing expressly to say upon the point. Nor is there any ex-
trinsic evidence available as to what, if anything, the framers
thought about it. In the early cases the courts do not seem
conscious of any problem. But whatever the original intention
may have been, it became the regular practice of the state courts,
though exceptions can be found, to apply in maritime cases the
same local law which they normally administered. The result
was that where maritime and common law diverged, the saving
jury involved;" that while a state may not provide a remedy in rem for
any cause of action within admiralty jurisdiction, it is othervwse "free to
adopt such remedies, and to attach to them such incidents, as it scsz fit."
7 Supra note 1, at 216, 37 Sup. Ct. at 529.
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clause gave a suitor a choice of rights as well as of forum. This
practice had been so long continued that to the contemporary
generation of admiralty lawyers it seemed a part of the tradi-
tional system. Hence, to those steeped in the tradition, the Jon-
sen decision brought a decided shock.8
One of the striking features of the Jensen case is the complete
failure of the majority opinion to recognize that there had been
any such existing precedent, or that the uniformity involved
differed from the uniformity under discussion in The Lottawanna
-the authority principally relied on. Had the litigation arisen
in admiralty, there would have been no occasion for the opinion
to say more than it did. But in the light of existing practice and
tradition and the prior decisions of the Court itself, the differ-
ence between a cause brought in admiralty and one arising in a
state tribunal was of fundamental importance. Whether the
majority did not fully appreciate this or simply chose to ignore
it, we can only surmise.
Precedent aside, the objections made to the Jensen doctrine
seem minor. It is said that common-law judges will be compelled
to administer an unfamiliar system of law. Also, close questions
of jurisdiction can no longer be avoided by bringing suit under
the saving clause in a common-law court, where in the past the
local law would have governed in any event. Now, such a court
must always determine the jurisdictional question in order to
know which system of law to apply. While these objections may
have some force, they are offset by the logical and practical ad-
vantage of having the rights of the parties to a particular con-
troversy determinable by a single standard of substantive law.
As an original proposition it is difficult to see why one of two
litigants should have the privilege, denied to his opponent, not
only of choosing the forum, but of selecting one of two varying
sets of rules for the determination of the controversy. Once the
choice is made, the defending party has no right of removal.
Hence it is likely that, as the novelty wears off, the broad doc-
trine of Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen will in its practical opera-
tion receive general approval. This at least seems to be the
present trend of opinion within the admiralty bar.
Whatever the ultimate merits of the Jensen doctrine, its hostile
reception was enhanced by its immediate effect in depriving long-
shoremen and similar workers of the benefits of workmen's com-
pensation. Within a few months Congress had taken action
to obviate this result through the passage of tJhe Act of October
8 See, for example, the articles by Cunningham, mtpra note 2, and Iough,
Admiralty Jurisdiction-of Late Years (1924) 37 HA V. L. R v. 529, 5037
et seq.; see also Justice Pitney, dissenting, in the Jensen case, supra note
1, at 239, 37 Sup. Ct. at 538.
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6, 1917.9 The means adopted was an amendment of the saving
clause, which had been in continuous effect since first enacted
in 1789. To the old provision "saving to suitors, in all cases,
the right of a common-law remedy, where the common law is
competent to give it," was added "and to claimants the rights
and remedies under the workmen's compensation law of any
state."
In Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Steu .rt,1' the question was pre-
sented to the Supreme Court whether this Act of 1917 was con-
stitutional. In that case an award had been made under the New
York compensation statute to the widow and children of a barge-
man, who while doing work of a maritime nature had been
drowned in the Hudson River. The award was approved by the
Court of Appeals, but again its judgment was reversed by the
Supreme Court by a five-to-four vote. The Act of 1917 did not
do away with the effect of the Jczscn case, since the enactment
was beyond the powers of Congress. In this decision the Su-
preme Court carried the uniformity requirement into its last
and most extr'eme stage of development. While the opinion rests
in part on the general principle of the non-delegability of legis-
lative power, the major emphasis is placed upon the doctrine
which the Court derives from the grant of judicial power to
the federal government made by Section 2 of Article III of the
Constitution. Speaking of Congress, the Court says: 1
"Its power to legislate concerning rights and liabilities within
the maritime jurisdiction and remedies for their enforcement,
arises from the Constitution, as above indicated. The definite
object of the grant was to conmmit direct control to the Federal
Government; to relieve maritime commerce from unnecessary
burdens and disadvantages incident to discordant legislation; and
to establish, so far as practicable, harmonious and uniform rules
applicable throughout every part of the Union.
"Considering the fundamental purpose in view and the definite
end for which such rules were accepted, we must conclude that in
their characteristic features and essential international and in-
terstate relations, the latter may not be repealed, amended or
changed except by legislation which embodies both the will and
deliberate judgment of Congress. The subject was intrusted
to it to be dealt with according to its discretion-not for dele-
gation to others. To say that because Congress could have
enacted a compensation act applicable to maritime injuries, it
could authorize the States to do so as they might desire, is false
reasoning. Moreover, such an authorization would inevitably
destroy the harmony and uniformity which the Constitution
not only contemplated but actually established-it would defeat
the very purpose of the grant."
340 STAT. 395 (1917), 2S U. S. C. §§ 41 (3), 371 (1026).
1o 253 U. S. 149, 40 Sup. Ct. 438 (1920).
11 Ibid. 164, 40 Sup. Ct. at 441.
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This argument involves two aspects. First, the maritime law,
in its characteristic features and essential international and
interstate relations, may not be changed except by the direct
legislation of Congress, embodying its will and deliberate judg-
ment. The constitutional grant in itself precludes any authoriza-
tion to the states to legislate or any adoption of prospective state
legislation. Secondly, the Constitution makes geographical uni-
formity a requisite of any federal legislation within the same
field. Possibly this second point was unnecessary to the de-
cision, but it has been generally assumed (by the dissenting
judges, among others) that such is the effect of the Stewart case.
The difference between the two limitations is material. For
Congress might, coiisistently with the first, provide for the vary-
ing needs of different localities through the establishment of
districts and the formulation of non-uniform rules applicable
thereto; or, as the dissenting opinion suggests, even the Act of
1917 could have been upheld by construing it to refer solely to
state laws in force at the time of its passage, the same being
incorporated by reference. But if all federal legislation must
have a uniform operation, any such course is foreclosed.
In the controversy over the Jensen case, the significance of this
Stewart decision and the extent to which it carries the uniform-
ity requirement beyond the scope of the earlier cases have not
received a due share of attention. The Lottawanna merely de-
clared that uniformity must be dominant in the non-statutory
maritime law, no question of congressional power being involved.
In Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen the question was one of uni-
formity as between courts, the conclusion being that the same
substantive law must be applied by all courts before which a
maritime controversy may be brought and that this law con-
stitutes a federal system over which Congress was declared to
have a paramount legislative power. The uniformity doctrine
as thus applied involves an extension of federal supremacy at
the expense of the states. In Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart
the uniformity doctrine operates as a limitation upon the powers
of Congress and hence involves an extension of the powers of the
courts at the expense of the legislative branch of the Government.
Since uniformity is imposed by the Constitution, only the courts
can say how far it goes. The consequence of the decision is that
Congress is deprived of power to determine what matters within
the admiralty jurisdiction need adaptation to varying local con-
ditions and what call for treatment by uniform rules. That di-
versity is desirable in some cases and uniformity in others has
always been, recognized. There has always been a border zone
in which state law has been applied to matters principally of lo-
cal concern. Of course this area of non-uniformity may be re-
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duced by Congress, as when the state statutes giving a lien upon
a vessel for supplies and repairs furnished in a home port were
superseded by the uniform federal Lien Act.- This is an inci-
dent of its paramount legislative power. Prior to the recent
decisions it would have been supposed that Congress had equal
power to enlarge the area of diversity, that in either event no
more was involved than the substantive content of the maritime
law. Now, while Congress may still extend the field of uniform-
ity it may not reduce it beyond the limits fixed by the courts.
The vital distinction between the uniformity of the Jcnsca
case and the uniformity of the Stewart case is thus plain. And
the difference leads to distinctly greater difficulty in considering
the justifiability of the respective doctrines. The principal
trouble with the Jensen case was that of finding sufficient war-
rant in the Constitution for imposing the maritime law upon
the state courts. In the Stewart case not only is the correspond-
ing difficulty enhanced by the greater lengths to which the uni-
formity principle is carried, but also whether the result is in
accordance with practical wisdom or sound statesmanship is
open to grave doubt.
As to the constitutional authority, it must always be remem-
berea that the entire uniformity principle is derived from the
simple grant of judicial power over "all cases of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction." The Constitution says nothing about
uniformity; in fact there are no express provisions of any kind
with respect to the substantive maritime law or the legislative
power thereover. The nearest thing we have to a contempo-
raneous interpretation-the saving clause of the original Judi-
ciary Act-makes clear that complete uniformity is not required.
For whatever may have been intended with regard to the sub-
stantive law, the saving clause makes uniformity of remedy
impossible. Uniformnity is secured, to be sure, as to the typical
admiralty remedy-the action in rem-since the latter is not
within the scope of the saving clause and hence is restricted to
the admiralty courts. 3 But other remedies, which are within
its terms, are as diverse as the procedural laws of the various
states.- So far as the Jensen case is concerned, the state courts
in the exercise of their concurrent jurisdiction had to apply
either state law or maritime law, and no decisive argument either
way can be derived from the letter of the Constitution. With
the result reached by the Supreme Court, the writer is not dis-
posed to quarrel. Although in conflict with existing precedent, it
1236 STAT. 604 (1910), 46 U. S. C. §§ 971-975 (192G).
13 The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411 (U. S. 1807); The Hine v. Trevor, 4
Wall. 555 (U. S. 1867).
14 Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., supra note 6; Knapp, Stout & Co.
v. McCaffrey, 177 U. S. 638, 20 Sup. Ct. 824 (1900).
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may be, as Professor Wright thinks,", in harmony with the needs
and larger tradition of admiralty law. The writer is unable,
however, to view with equal complacency the doctrine of Knicker-
bocker Ice Co. v. Stewart.
Certainly it is customary to assume that limitations upon the
legislative power are not to be lightly imposed, and where the
restriction must rest solely upon implication it would seem that
no more should be implied from the written Constitution than is
necessary to the fulfilment of its expressed purposes. The crux
of the matter thus appears to be whether or not it is essential
to the protection of the constitutiQnal grant of judicial power
over all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to deny to
Congress the power to control the matter of uniformity in the
substantive law. No doubt we may properly conclude that the
purpose of the grant was to remove the maritime law from the
direct control of the states with their local and conflicting in-
terests and to vest control in Congress. The Jensen case does
not necessarily mean more than this.16 But it is hard to say that
the national and international interests concerned cannot safely
be intrusted to Congress. The fairer conclusion would seem to
be that paramount power to fix and determine the maritime law
includes the power to determine the extent to which uniformity
of rule is needed. Indeed there is much force in the remark of
Justice Holmes in his dissenting opinion in the Stewart case,
that: 17
"To read into it [the clause concerning the judicial power] a
requirement of uniformity more mechanical than is educed from
the express requirement of equality in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment seems to me extravagant."
The practical question is not whether there should be uniform-
ity, but whether the power to determine how far it shall extend
ought to rest in the legislative or in the judicial branch of the
Government. Not only is there scant basis for the belief that
i5 Wright, op. cit. supra note 2.
161n the Jensen case no act of Congress was under attack. The only
federal enactment involved was the saving clause, which saves a common-
law remedy but is silent as to the substantive law to be applied in common-
law tribunals. The decision might have rested merely on the absence of
congressional authorization to such tribunals to apply local instead of
maritime law. At most the reasoning of the opinion should require that
a federal statute be held unconstitutional which specifically authorized the
application of local law in local tribunals, where that law differed from
the rules enforceable in admiralty. But there is an essential difference
between such a restriction and the taking from Congress of the power to
control the matter of uniformity in the single system of substantive law
which is to govern in all courts in maritime cases.
17Supra note 10, at 168, 40 Sup. Ct. at 443.
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Congress is not a fit judge of such matters, but in its very nature
the subject is legislative rather than judicial. In many situa-
tions uniformity is highly desirable, if not essential, to the pro-
tection of national interests; in others adaptation to local needs
and even subjection to local control is likewise desirable. This
is so even as to workmen's compensation, as the later cases make
clear. Where the line should be drawn must depend upon actual
conditions and the practical needs of the situation. It is not a
case for pure logic or theoretical speculation, but for the deter-
mination of facts. It is a job for the legislative body, with its
capacity for investigation and its closer contact with the world's
activities. Furthermore, the field is one in which conditions may
change. A matter which at one period may safely be left to
local control may need uniform regulation at another, and vice-
versa. The public interest is not served by the application of
constitutional rigidity, reinforced by the doctrine of stare de-
cisis, to matters which ought to be mobile and capable of ad-
justment to changing conditions.
This view is not without pragmatical support. For the actual
course of events indicates that Congress is likely to be no less
realistic than the Supreme Court in dealing with the problem
of uniformity. No doubt Congress in its haste went too far
in enacting the Act of 1917 in a form broad enough to include
seamen within its scope. On the other hand, with regard to
longshoremen and other harbor workers the Supreme Court has
quite lost sight of the realities of the situation. Its position on
this point was re-emphasized by its later decision in State of
Washington, v. W. C. Dawson & Co.s Following the Stczwrt
decision Congress had made a further attempt to evade the
rigid restriction imposed upon it with respect to uniformity. On
June 10, 1922, an act was adopted, ' which reenacted the pro-
vision of the Act of 1917, saving to claimants their rights and
remedies under the workmen's compensation law of any state,
but excepted from its operation "the master or members of the
crew of a vessel." In the Dawson case the Court held that this
amendment was insufficient to remove the objections set forth
in Knickerbocker Ice Co. -v. Stewart and declared the Act of
1922 likewise unconstitutional. It was even held that a state
compensation statute could not be applied to a stevedore em-
ployed on board ship, not by the shipowner as in the Jencn case,
but by an independent contracting stevedoring company.
This decision makes clear, if further clarity were needed after
the Stewart case, that Congress has no power to confine the
uniformity requirement within narrower limits than those ap-
proved by the Supreme Court. The Dawson. case also reiterates
• 264 U. S. 219, 44 Sup. Ct. 302 (1924).
1242 STAT. 634 (1922), 28 U. S. C. §§ 41 (3), 371 (192G).
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the conclusion of the Court that uniformity is required with
respect to the rights of a stevedore injured on navigable waters.'
In other words, his rights are not of merely local concern, but
involve either the characteristic features or the essential inter-
national or interstate relations of the maritime law-presumably
the former, since there is no indication that the result depends
upon whether or not the ship in question is engaged in inter-
state or foreign commerce.
One may well wonder what practical end is gained by this
requirement of geographical uniformity in the rights of in-
jured stevedores, especially when in the service of a local inde-
pendent contractor. Where both employer and employee are
local residents, whose interests are local, and the service is per-
formed wholly in a single port, little good is accomplished by
identity of the workman's rights to compensation in New York
and San Francisco. It means nothing either to employer or to
employee, and the shipowner has no direct concern with the
matter. Justification may be found only in the realm of pure
theory, uncontaminated by reality. Where a harbor worker is
employed directly by the ship on which he works, the argument
for uniformity has somewhat more substance. From the point
of view of the shipowner it may be helpful to have his respon-
sibilities determined so far as possible by a single standard,
wherever the vessel may go. But the point of view of the em-
ployee should not be disregarded. He is not an itinerant and so
far as his interests are concerned, there is no reason why he
should be treated differently from his fellow-workers on land.
And uniformity on the water makes adaptation to local con-
ditions and standards of living impossible. Moreover, if he
works both on land and on water, as does a stevedore, the uni-
formity of his own rights is destroyed. If he happens to suffer
injury on shore or on the wharf, his rights are determined by
state law; if the accident occurs on board ship, the maritime law
governs. Owing to the introduction of workmen's compensation,
this lack of uniformity has resulted in real hardship. 0 Further-
more, the benefit to the shipowner in this situation is no more
than nominal, since if any of the labor is performed on land
it is necessary for him to insure under the state compensation
act in any event. As a matter of both public and private in-
terest, the slight gain to him from geographical uniformity is
outweighed by the importance of uniformity in the rights of the
individual employee and of uniformity as between different
classes of local workers. In short, a geographical uniformity
20 See references cited by Justice Brandeis in his dissenting opinion in
State of Washington v. Dawson & Co., supra note 18, at 237, n. 20, 44
Sup. Ct. at 309, n. 22.
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of little more than theoretical value has been achieved at the
expense of practical justice.
This marks the farthest extent to which the uniformity re-
quirement has been carried. Rightly or wrongly, the doctrines
developed by these cases are now a part of our organic law. De-
spite the close vote by which they were established, they are,
in their main features at least, here to stay, since there is little
prospect of more than minor modifications. The forceful dis-
senting opinion of Justice Brandeis in State of Washingtoit r.
Dawson & Co. is the swan song of a lost cause. This establish-
ment of uniformity, however, is by no means the end of the
story so far as workmen's compensation is concerned. It is plain
that in most cases the state compensation acts can have no ap-
lication to maritime injuries. But questions remain which have
been a source of difficulty and confusion to both bench and bar.
What are the limits of admiralty jurisdiction with respect to
workmen's compensation? And within that jurisdiction what
room is there left for the application of the compensation stat-
utes of the states? Finally, the scope and effect of federal coni-
pensation legislation remain to be considered.
THE PLACE LEFT TO STATE COMPENSATION ACTS
Iijuries on land. In the cases so far discussed the matters
involved fell well within the limits of maritime jurisdiction.
Hence there was no occasion to consider what those limits are
so far as workmen's compensation is concerned. Difficulty may
arise in this regard owing to the fact that there is no single
test of jurisdiction in admiralty. In matters of tort the juris-
diction depends upon locality-the injury must occur upon navi-
gable waters. 2 In contract cases the subject-matter of the con-
tract is decisive. If the subject-matter is maritime, admiralty
has jurisdiction; otherwise not, and in either event the place
of making or performance is not controlling.2  In the Jcscn,
Stewart and Dawson cases both of these tests were met. The
contracts of employment were maritime in nature and the in-
juries occurred on board ship or elsewhere upon navigable
waters. But an employee may be injured on land while en-
gaged in the performance of a maritime contract, or upon the
water while perfornming a non-maritime contract. According to
one test of jurisdiction the matter is maritime; according to
the other it is not. Which shall govern when a state worknen's
compensation act is sought to be applied?
2: The Plymouth, 3 Wall. 20 (U. S. 1866); Atlantic Transport Co. v.
Tmbrovek, 234 U. S. 52, 34 Sup. Ct. 733 (1914).
22 New England Mutual Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 11 Wall. 1 (U. S.
1871); North Pacific S. S. Co. v. Hall Bros. Co., 249 U. S. 119, 39 Sup. Ct.
221 (1919).
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The first of these two situations was presented to the Supreme
Court in State Industrial Commission v. Nordenholt Corp.23
This case, like the Jensen and Dawson cases, involved injuries to
a stevedore suffered in the course of his maritime employment.
The difference lay in the fact that the accident occurred on the
dock (i. e., on land), instead of on board ship. An order award-
ing compensation was made by the Industrial Commission of
New York, but was reversed by the Court of Appeals. The con-
clusion reached by the latter court that the state statute could
'not be applied, was based upon its views as to the nature of
workmen's compensation.24 It followed the widely-held theory
that the obligation imposed by compensation acts, even of the
compulsory type, is contractual in nature, that the statute giving
the commission power to make an award is read into and becomes
a part of the agreement. Since a stevedore's contract of em-
ployment is maritime, it was concluded that the application of
the state statute would amount to the regulation of a maritime
contract and hence would constitute an infringement upon
the jurisidiction of admiralty. This judgment, however, was
reversed by the United States Supreme Court. A superficial
view of its decision may lead to the supposition that jurisdiction
for purposes of workmen's compensation is determined by the
tort test of locality rather than by the contract test of subject-
matter. But a closer examination of the opinion will reveal
that this is not necessarily the case. The Supreme Court ap-
proached the issue from a fundamentally different point of view
from that of the state Court of Appeals, and looked not at the
nature of workmen's compensation, but at the existing state of
the maritime law. It said: 2 5
"Insana was injured upon the dock, an extension of the land,
(Cleveland Terminal & Valley R. R. Co. v. Cleveland S. S. Co., 208
U. S. 316 ... ), and certainly prior to the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act the employer's liability for damages would have de-
pended upon the common law and the state statutes. Conse-
quently, when the Compensation Act superseded other state laws
touching the liability in question, it did not come into conflict
with any superior maritime law. And this is true whether
awards under the act are made as upon implied agreements or
otherwise. The stevedore's contract of employment did not
23 259 U. S. 263, 42 Sup. Ct. 473 (1922). The decision was followed in
T. Smith & Son v. Taylor, 48 Sup. Ct. 228 (U. S. 1928).
24See Doey v. Howland Co., Inc., 224 N. Y. 30, 120 N. E. 53 (1918),
cert. denied, 248 U. S. 574, 39 Sup. Ct. 11 (1918); Anderson v. Johnson
Lighterage Co., 224 N. Y. 539, 120 N. E. 55 (1918), cert. denied, 248 U. S.
574, 39 Sup. Ct. 11 (1918); Keator v. Rock Plaster Manufacturing Co.,
224 N. Y. 540, 120 N. E. 56 (1918), cert. denied, 248 U. S. 574, 39 Sup. Ct.
12 (1918).
25 Supra note 23, at 275, 42 Sup. Ct. at 475.
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contemplate any dominant federal rule concerning the master's
liability for personal injuries received on land. In Jensen's
case, rights and liabilities were definitely fixed by maritime
rules, whose uniformity was essential. With these the local
law came into conflict. Here no such antagonism exists. There
is no pertinent federal statute; and application of the local
law will not work material prejudice to any characteristic fea-
ture of the general maritime law."
This paragraph makes clear that in the Nordehaholt case no
question of jurisdiction at all is actually decided. It has been
recognized in all these cases that uniformitr is not required
throughout the entire field of admiralty jurisdiction, but only
as to the characteristic features of the general maritime law
and its essential international and interstate relations. And
where uniformity is not necessary, admiralty has often been
accustomed to resort to state law to supplement its own rules.
Here we have a situation, involving personal injury to a harbor
worker suffered on land, to which no e.xisting rules of the mari-
time law are applicable. To deal with the matter on a tort
basis, as is done when the injury is on navigable waters,
would be beyond the limits of admiralty jurisdiction. And the
maritime law gives an injured harbor worker (unlike a sea-
man) no rights of a contractual nature. Under these cir-
cumstances it is obvious that no characteristic feature of the
general maritime law can be prejudiced by the application of
a state compensation statute. Unless local law of some sort is
resorted to, injured workmen will be totally without relief.
The Nordenlolt decision may thus be supported, regardless
of the real nature of workmen's compensation or of the ultimate
limits of admiralty jurisdiction. What those limits are for pur-
poses of compensation legislation has never been decided by the
Supreme Court. In order to raise the question in this situation,
it would be necessary to inquire whether or not the maritime
law could be so extended as to supersede the law of the state.
Precisely this problem would be presented, if Congress should
pass a workmen's compensation act applicable to all injuries
arising out of and in the course of maritime employment, re-
gardless of their location. It would seem that the validity of
such an act could not be determined without considering the
nature of workmen's compensation and fitting it into the cate-
gories of admiralty jurisdiction. The answer should not be
difficult. If the federal legislation sounded in tort, it would of
course be unconstitutional as applied to an injury on land, since
it would exceed the bounds of a jurisdiction limited by locality.
It is generally agreed, however, that workmen's compensation,
which imposes liability irrespective of fault, does not rest on
any theory of tort. Such legislation is commonly explained
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either upon a contract theory-the view taken by the New York
courts-or upon a theory of status, the idea being that the ob-
ligation to pay compensation is a statutory one imposed by law
upon the status of employer and employee. Though the relation
has its inception in a contract, once created its incidents depend
not merely upon the agreement of the parties, but upon the
provisions of the law. 26
According to the first of these two theories, the supposed fed-
eral act would clearly be valid in its application to land injuries.
For it would be no more -than the regulation of a maritime con-
tract-an exercise of a jurisdiction as to which locality is not
controlling. If the second theory were followed, the question
would be whether legislation regulating the incidents of a status'
arising out of maritime employment should be governed by the
tort test or the contrac test of admiralty jurisdiction. Here it
seems almost equally plain that the regulation of the rights
and obligations of maritime employment, whether or not strictly
a matter of contract, is more closely identified with the field of
contract than with the field of tort. Certainly in order to be
fullkr effective, such regulation should govern the entire employ-
ment, wherever the services may be performed. It follows that
the state compensation statute would be displaced by the federal
act, and the result of Industrial Commission v. Nordenholt Corp.
reversed. Hence it seems that viewed purely as a matter of
jurisdiction, the conclusion reached by the New York court in
that case was sound, and that its reversal by the federal Supreme
Court must rest solely upon the ground that, regardless of juris-
diction, the state law did not work material prejudice to any
characteristic feature of the general maritime law.
In the event of federal legislation such as that supposed,
another question of some theoretical interest would arise with
respect to the conflict between the federal statute and the tort
law of a state. An injury to a maritime employee on land would
fall with the contract jurisdiction of admiralty, but equally
within the jurisdiction of the state so far as tort law is con-
cerned. Thus both federal and state laws could provide recom-
pense for the same injury without, considered alone, exceeding
their proper sphere. Of course the employee could not have a
double recovery. Conceivably he might have an option as to
which remedy to pursue, but it is probable that the federal law
would have exclusive application. Since a remedy in workmen's
compensation is normally made exclusive of all other remedies,
the federal act could not be given full effect without displacing
20 See North Alaska Salmon Co. v. Pillsbury, 174 Cal. 1, 162 Pac. 93
(1916); Angell, Recovery under Workmen's Compensation Acts for Injury
Abroad (1918) 31 HARv. L. RMB. 619.
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the state law of torts, and if either must yield, it should be
the latter.
A clear understanding of the Nordcizolt decision is material
in considering another and perhaps the most important question
remaining undecided with regard to the state compensation acts
-- namely, whether they may be applied to a seaman, who in the
course of his employment is injured on the shore or dock. Super-
ficially this resembles the Nordenholt case. The difference lies
in the differing rights which our non-statutory maritime law
gives to an injured seaman, as compared with an injured steve-
dore or other harbor worker. The rights of the latter lie simply
in a tort action for damages based on negligence, substantially
similar to (and in fact derived from) those given an injured
workman by the common law.27 The rights of an injured sea-
man, derived from the general maritime law, are quite differ-
ent.L2 If he falls sick or is wounded in the service of his ship,
he is entitled to his wages to the end of the voyage and to his
maintenance and cure for the same period and probably for a
reasonable time thereafter. This right exists regardless of the
negligence of his employer, his fellow-seamen or himself.
Beyond that he is entitled to an indemnity, i. c., to compensatory
damages, only for injuries received in consequence of the un-
seaworthiness of the ship, or a failure to supply and keep in
order the proper appliances appurtenant to the ship.
Much as these rights of the seaman vary from those of an
injured harbor worker, the difference might not be material for
our purposes if the former, like the latter, rested upon a tort
basis. According to the notions of the maritime law, however,
such is not the case. In admiralty the right to wages, mainten-
ance and cure has always been regarded as contractual in nature,
being derived by implication from the seaman's contract of em-
ployment.29 In fact it bears a striking resemblance to work-
men's compensation itself. In both cases the employer is under
a legal obligation, arising either out of the contract, or out of
the relation created by contract, to aid an employee who suffers
injury in the course of his employment. And in both cases the
obligation exists regardless of fault. So far as the nature of the
obligation is concerned, it would seem to be identical in the two
cases, and it should be governed by the contract test rather than
27 Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, szpra note 21; Southern Pacific
Co. v. Jensen, supra note 1, at 220, 37 Sup. Ct. at 531.
2s The Osceola, 1S9 U. S. 153, 23 Sup. Ct. 483 (1903); Chelentis v.
Luckenbach S. S. Co., 247 U. S. 372, 33 Sup. Ct 501 (1918); Smith,
Liability -in thR Adiralty for I2jzries to Seamen (1900) 19 HAInV. L. REV.
418.
29 The Osceola, supra note 28; Cresci v. Standard Fisherics, ' F. (2d)
378 (N. D. Cal. 1925) ; see The Atlantic, 2 Fed. Cas. 121, 10 (S. D. N. Y.
1849).
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the tort test of jurisdiction. Hence a seaman injured on land
in the service of his ship should -be entitled to wages, mainten-
ance and cure. This result has recently been reached by the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit."
The nature of the seaman's right to indemnity for injuries due
to unseaworthiness of the ship or to defective appliances cannot
be stated with the same certainty. This right did not exist under
the early maritime codes. It was created in England by statute,
and in the United States by judicial decision'1 Under the
English statute it seems clear that the right to indemnity, like
the right to wages, maintenance and cure, was contractual in
nature. The statute 32 provided that "In every contract of ser-
vice, express or implied, between the owner of a ship and the
master or any seaman thereof .. . there shall be implied, not-
withstanding any agreement to the contrary, an obligation on
the owner of the ship" that all reasonable means shall be used
to insure the seaworthiness of the ship. In this country also
the shipowner's obligation to pay compensatory damages has
been regarded by some commentators as grounded in contract.",
The recent tendency of the federal courts, however, has been to
treat an action for indemnity on a tort basis, and jurisdiction
in admiralty has been denied where the seaman was injured on
land.Y
30 The Montezuma, 19 F. (2d) 355 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927); see also BENEDIcT,
ADMIRALTY (5th ed. 1925) §§ 27, 29.
31 The Osceola, supra note 28, at 175, 23 Sup. Ct. at 487; 2 PAnsoNs,
SHIPPING AND ADmmALTY (1869) 78.
32 Merchant Shipping Act of 1876, 39 and 40 ViCT. c. 80, § 5; see Hedley
v. Pinckney & Sons S. S. Co., [1894] A. C. 222.
33 Smith, op. cit. supra note 28, at 432; HUGHES, ADmIRALTY (2d ed. 1920)
§ 101.
34 The Mary Garrett, 63 Fed. 1009 (N. D. Cal. 1894); The Montezuma,
supra note 30.
In the Montezuma, a libel in admiralty was filed by a seaman for dam-
ages for personal injuries received on a dock. The district court dismissed
the libel for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the jurisdiction invoked
was ex delicto and must be determined by the locality of the injury. 15
F. (2d) 580 (W. D. N. Y. 1926). The Circuit Court of Appeals approved
this conclusion so far as compensatory damages were concerned, but re-
versed the judgment on the ground that the libellant should have been al-
lowed a recovery for maintenance and cure.
In the following cases, it was held that the rights under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act extended to seamen at their option by the Jones
Act [41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U. S. C. § 688 (1926)] do not apply to
injuries received on land: Hughes v. Alaska S. S. Co., 287 Fed. 427 (W.
D. Wash. 1923); Soper v. Hammond Lumber Co., 4 F. (2d) 872 (N. D.
Cal. 1925); Todahl v. Sudden & Christenson, 5 F. (2d) 462 (C. C. A.
9th, 1925). For the contrary view, see BENEDICT, op. cit. supra note 30,
§ 25; Magruder & Grout, Wrongfmil Death within the Admiralty Jurisdic-
tion (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 395, 429. The cases cited seem correctly decided,
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If it should ultimately be determined that the right to in-
demnity, together with that to wages, maintenance and cure, is
a matter of contract, the conclusion is inevitable that a state
worlmen's compensation act could no more be applied to a sea-
man injured on land than to one injured on the water. In either
event the substantive rights given by the .maritime law would
be the same. And regardless of the difference between such
rights and those given by the state statute, it cannot be said
that the maritime law does not cover the field. Hence a conflict
between the two systems eists, which was not present in ihe
case of a stevedore injured on land. Obviously, characteristic
features of the general maritime law are involved in the law of
seamen, and the state law must yield. The situation would be
substantially the same as if a federal compensation act were in
force, applicable to seamen and covering all injuries arising out
of and in the course of their employment.
Suppose, however, that the seaman's right to indemnity is to
be placed on a tort basis. If injured on land, his rights under
the maritime law will then be confined to wages, maintenance
and cure. Even this right, it would seem, would have to be
denied him, had the Nordenholt decision rested on jurisdictional
grounds. If jurisdiction for purposes of worknen's compensa-
tion were determined by locality, the right to maintenance and
cure should be similarly limited, since the two seem indistinguish-
able from the jurisdictional point of view. But if the Xordcdz-
wit case has been correctly analyzed, it does not involve juris-
diction but rests upon the ground that the state statute did not
come into conflict with any characteristic feature of the general
maritime law. Then the present question will depend upon
whether there is a similar absence of conflict in the seaman's
case. Such conflict may be avoided only upon the assumption
that the workmen's compensation remedy may cover the field
occupied in the maritime law by the right to indemnity, without
overlapping the right to wages, maintenance and cure.
So far as the two maritime rights are concerned, they may
readily be regarded as separable. The one reimburses a sea-
man for the actual expense of maintenance and care made neces-
sary by his injury; the other compensates him for such addi-
tional damage as he may have suffered. The two are supple-
mentary. For example the receipt, even as the result of suit, of
wages and the cost of maintenance and cure is no bar to a sub-
since the right given by the Employers' Liability Act is merely a nodifi-
cation of the common-law right to damages for personal injury and hcnce
is clearly in tort. For the same reason these cases are not of weight in
considering the application to land injuries of the right to indemnity givin
by the maritime law.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
sequent libel for indemnity35 It follows that any state law,
the function of which could be made equivalent to that of the
maritime right of indemnity, could be applied to a seaman
injured on land. There would be no objection to an ordinary
common-law action in tort for damages for personal injury. A
state employers' liability act should not differ, since, unlike
workmen's compensation, it is founded in tort, merely removing
certain common-law defenses.a6 Distinctly greater difficulty is
presented by the state workmen's compefisation statutes. They
purport to cover the entire field of rights and remedies accruing
to an injured workman. Even the limited interest protected
by the right to maintenance and cure must be included within
their scope.37 It cannot be specially excluded in determining the
amount of the award, as might be done in a tort action, since the
scale of compensation is rigidly fixed by the statute itself. More-
over, the liability imposed upon the employer by a typical act
is expressly made exclusive of all other liability. The state
statute thus could not be given effect without superseding the
seaman's maritime right to maintenance and cure. But state
law will not be permitted so to supersede a rule of the maritime
law where characteristic features of the latter are involved.
And one of the most characteristic rules of the admiralty is in-
volved in the right to wages, maintenance and cure.
Furthermore, when the practical effect upon uniformity is
considered, it seems altogether probable that the Supreme Court
will find the right to wages, maintenance and cure sufficient to
prevent the application of state compensation acts to seamen
injured on land. Nowhere is uniformity more essential than in
the relations of a seaman to his ship, and it sometimes happens
that in the course of his duties he is required to go on shore or
on the dock. If on every such occasion it were necessary for
the shipowner to insure under and otherwise comply with the
35 The Rolph, 299 Fed. 52 (C. C. A. 9th, 1924), cert. denied, 266 U. S.
614, 45 Sup. Ct. 96 (1924) ; see also The A. Heaton, 43 Fed. 592 (D. Iass.
1890); John A. Roebling's Sons Co. v. Erickson, 261 Fed. 986 (C. C. A. 2d,
1919), cert. denied, 252 U. S. 585, 40 Sup. Ct. 394 (1920).
36 The receipt of wages, maintenance and cure does not bar an action
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, the benefits of which are ex-
tended to seamen by the Jones Act. Peterson v. Pacific S. S. Co., 145 Wash.
460, 261 Pac. 115 (1927), cert. granted, 276 U. S. 612, 48 Sup. Ct. 321
(1928) ; cf. supra note 34. But an unsuccessful suit in admiralty for indem-
nity will bar a subsequent action under the Jones Act. Baltimore S. S.
Co. v. Phillips, 274 U. S. 316, 47 Sup. Ct. 600 (1927).
37 The existence of such conflict has been expressly recognized in the
British Workmen's Compensation Act, which is applicable to seamen, in a
provision to the effect that the weekly payment of compensation shall not
be payable in respect of the period during which a shipowner may be
liable under the Merchant Shipping Act to pay the expenses of maintenance
of the injured seamen. 6 EDW. VII, c. 58, § 7 (1907).
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local compensation statute, the lack of uniformity would be dis-
tinctly more serious than in any case involving a stevedore who
is locally employed, regardless of the place of his injury. Such
diversity of rule would be permitted by the Supreme Court only
with the greatest reluctance.
Injuries on naivigable waters. The preceding discussion has
been devoted to injuries occurring on land. The application of
state worlken's compensation acts to injuries upon navigable
waters will next be considered. The Jcnisen and D.wson cases
have established that the state statutes cannot be applied to a
stevedore injured on the water. A fortiori a seaman so injured
is beyond their reach. But some labor performed there has a
more remote connection with shipping and navigation. The
contract of employment may not even be maritime at all. If
it is non-maritime, may the state compensation statute control?
This question, the converse of that involved in Statc Ind'dast ' i
Commission v. Nordenlholt Corp., was presented to the Supreme
Court in Grant Smith-Porter Co. v. Rohde.2 '
Rohde was injured while at work as a carpenter upon a par-
tially completed vessel lying in navigable waters within the state
of Oregon. His contract of employment was non-maritime, since
it is settled that such is the status of contracts for ship-con-
struction, even as to work doiie after launching.-9 There was in
effect in Oregon a compensation act of the optional type, the
parties being required to notify the proper state authority if
it was desired not to come under the act. Neither Rohde nor
his employer had given such notification and all steps required
to bring the employment within the statute had been taken.
Rohde, however, did not seek compensation, but filed a libel in
admiralty against his employer to recover damages for per-
sonal injury. The case came to the Supreme Court on certificate
from the Circuit Court of Appeals. The questions certified were:
"1. Is there ju-isdiction in admiralty because the alleged tort
occurred on navigable waters? 2. Is libelant entitled because
of his injury to proceed in admiralty against respondent for
the damages suffered?" The answers given by the Supreme
Court were as follows: 0
"Construing the first question as meaning to inquire whether
the general admiralty jurisdiction extends to a proceeding to
recover damages resulting from a tort committed on a vessel in
process of construction when lying on navigable waters within
a State, we answer, yes.
32 257 U. S. 469, 42 Sup. Ct. 157 (1922).
39 Thames Towboat Co. v. The Francis McDonald, 254 U. S. 242, 41 Sup.
Ct 65 (1920); Roach v. Chapman, 22 How. 129 (U. S. 1859); People's
Ferry Co. v. Beers, 20 How. 393 (U. S. 1S57).
-oSupra note 38, at 477, 42 Sup. Ct. at 159.
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"Assuming that the second question presents the inquiry
whether in the circumstances stated the exclusive features of
the Oregon Worlunen's Compensation Act would apply and
abrogate the right to recover damages in an admiralty court
which otherwise would exist, we also answer, yes."
The certification of the first of these questions calls for some
explanation. It must have been due to doubt as to whether local-
ity is the exclusive test of tort jurisdiction in admiralty, as has
generally been assumed, or whether it must also appear that the
tort was otherwise of a maritime nature. The possibility of
some such requirement had been noticed by the Supreme Court,
but the question had been left undecided.41 If such an addition
should be made to the locality test, it might well be argued
(as it was argued by counsel in the Rohde case) that the test
is not met when the tort occurs in the course of the performance
of a non-maritime contract. Such a conclusion would have made
further consideration of the Rohde case unnecessary, since if
neither the contract nor the tort were maritime, there would
be nothing to prevent the application of the state statute. The
Court, however, held that the general admiralty jurisdiction did
extend to such a proceeding. The basis for this result is left
unexplained. Either it means that locality is to be the sole test
in tort cases, or that ship-construction, though deemed non-mari-
time for purposes of contract, has a sufficiently close connection
with shipping and navigation to satisfy such additional limita-
tion as may be imposed.
Assuming then that the transaction did fall within the tort
jurisdiction of admiralty, we may next inquire why it is that
the state law may govern. The Court decided this point upon
the same ground upon which it rested its decision in the Nor-
denholt case, holding that under the circumstances of the case
the local law would not work material prejudice to any charac-
teristic feature of the general maritime law, nor interfere with
the proper harmony or uniformity of that law in its international
or interstate relations. Again, as in the Nordenholt case, this
argument made it unnecessary to consider the jurisdictional as-
pects of worlkmen's compensation.
Although at present of no more than theoretical interest, the
matter of jurisdiction may, however, be worth a moment's
digression. The conclusion reached earlier in this article was
that power to pass compensation legislation should be determined
by the contract test and not the tort of jurisdiction. If this is
correct, Congress could not en'act a federal compensation law
41Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, supra note 21. Outside of the
decisions of the Supreme Court, theie is authority to support the addition
of such a limitation to the locality test. Campbell v. H. Hackfeld & Co.,
125 Fed. 696 (C. C. A. 9th, 1903); BENEDICT, Op. cit. stipra note 30, § 127.
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applicable to employment under a non-maritime contract even
though performed upon navigable waters. But it does not neces-
sarily follow that state legislation of the same sort could con-
stitutionally be applied. The difficulty is due to the inconsistent
tests of admiralty jurisdiction in contract and in tort. Here,
although the contract jurisdiction is clearly vested in the state,
the Supreme Court holds that the transaction falls within the
tort jurisdiction of admiralty. And the trouble with a state
compensation statute is that, though founded in contract, it is
made exclusive of all other remedies. Hence it could not be
given full effect without destroying the right to a tort action in
admiralty. So far as jurisdiction is concerned, it seems plain
that a state could not so exercise its contract jurisdiction as to
prevent the exercise by admiralty of its jurisdiction in tort.
The state statute might be upheld provided the provision making
its remedy exclusive were so modified as to leave the worlanen
an option to pursue a tort action in admiralty. But the exclu-
siveness of the statute's operation can be sustained only upon
the theory adopted by the Supreme Court, that the transaction
is merely of local concern and outside the scope of the uniformity,
requirement.
One result of this is that the exclusive operation of the state
statute is dependent upon the will of Congress. For the para-
mount legislative power of that body extends not merely to the
zone within which uniformity is necessary but to the full limits
of admiralty jurisdiction, so that the application of any state
law within that jurisdiction may be terminated by conflicting
federal legislation. Thus there is nothing to prevent Congress
from establishing rules of substantive law controlling a case like
Rohde's, provided those rules are based upon the principles of
tort. So far as the state law were incompatible therewith, the
local rules would have to yield.
Fortunately it is not probable that Congress would interfere
in any such way with the application of state compensation legis-
lation to worlunen employed upon navigable waters in the per-
formance of non-maritime contracts. On the contrary, it has
sought to give the local laws a larger scope than the Supreme
Court has been willing to permit. In the situation under dis-
cussion both bodies are agreed that local rules are preferable to
those of general application. It is doubtful enough whether
42 Even upon this ground the Rohdc case has distinct novelty. For in no
previous instance had state law been enforced in ca-sc falling within
maritime jurisdiction, where its effect was to abrogate the right to bring
suit in admiralty which otherwise would e-ast. That result is of courze
a consequence of the novel feature of worknen's compensation. It is un-
objectionable, provided the matter is of no more than local concern and no
characteristic features of the general maritime law are involved.
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geographical uniformity should be required in the rights of
stevedores. There would be no justification whatever for such
a requirement with respect to employment so purely local as
Rohde's. If state law is ever to have effect within the maritime
jurisdiction, it should be here. Hence the Rohde decision was a
necessary limitation upon the uniformity doctrine, and falls into
line with the prior development of the maritime law.
The problem remaining for consideration is that of determin-
ing more closely just what the circumstances were which made
Rohde's rights merely of local concern. The test to be derived
from his case has become the critical factor in the rights of the
harbor worker who is injured upon the water. The Court's ex-
planation is as follows: 4
"The contract for constructing 'The Ahala' was non-maritime,
and although the incompleted structure upon which the accident
occurred was lying in navigable waters, neither Rohde's general
employment, nor his activities at the time had any direct rela-
tion to navigation or commerce. Thames Towboat Co. v. The
Schooner 'Francis McDonald,' 254 U. 8. 242.... The injury was
suffered within a State whose positive enactment prescribed an
exclusive remedy therefor. And as both parties had accepted
and proceeded under the statute by making payments to the In-
dustrial Accident Fund it cannot properly be said that they
consciously contracted with each other in contemplation of the
general system of maritime law."
There are tvo distinct factors stated here. The first relates
to the type of work Rohde was doing. The state law may govern
without undue prejudice to the maritime law, because employ-
ment in ship-building has no direct relation to navigation or
commerce. But the Court also stresses the fact that both parties
had accepted and proceeded under the statute by making pay-
ments thereunder. It is difficult to see any significance in the
language used, unless the Court meant that the optional nature
of the Oregon statute was also a material factor in the decision.
The opinion gives little indication of the relative importance of
these two circumstances. The only generalization that could
safely be made from it is that if the employment is so local in
character that it bears only an indirect relation to navigation
or commerce and if also the compensation act is of the optional
type, then the state law will control. But there is no necessary
connection between these two factors. One may be present
without the other. Under such circumstances, may the local
statute be applied, and if so, is it the type of work or the type
of statute that is decisive? The opinion in the Rohde case left
the lower courts in much doubt as to these points.
The New York courts were confronted with the problem In
43 SurIna note 38, at 475, 42 Sup. Ct. at 158.
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Lahti v. Terry & Tenich Co., iz.4 There a worlknan employed
in the construction of a pier was injured while standing upon a
floating raft. It is evident that his employment and activities
were as local as Rohde's. But the New York compensation stat-
ute was of the compulsory type, no option being given the parties
as to its application. Hence if the elective nature of the Oregon
statute was an essential factor in the Rohde decision, it would
he necessary to decide the Lahti case the other way. The Court
of Appeals concluded that the difference in the form of statute
must be vital, and that a compulsory act could not be applied to
an injury upon navigable waters even where the employment
was of a local nature. But its judgment denying compensation
was reversed by the United States Supreme Court in a memo-
randum decision.45 Although the higher court gave no explana-
tion of its decision, the only conclusion to be drawn is that the
type of the compensation statute, whether compulsory or elective,
is immaterial, and that the local law may be applied in any case
where the workman's employment and activities have no direct
relation to navigation or commerce. This result is in harmony
with the general limitations which the Supreme Court has placed
upon the requirement of uniformity. The issue is whether or
not the application of local rules would work material prejudice
to any characteristic feature of the maritime law, and this de-
pends upon the objective circumstances and not upon the choice
of the parties. Nevertheless it is surprising that only a memo-
randum decision should have been handed down in this case.
Whatever the merits, the language used in the Rohdc opinion
left the point involved open to reasonable doubt, and the state-
ments there made as to the acceptance by the parties of the state
statute seem to be deprived of significance by the later decision.
The desirability of clarifying a confusing situation, coupled with
the eminence of the court whose judgment was reversed, would
seem to have called for the writing of an opinion.
Another situation exists which is the converse of that pre-
sented in the LWht case. There the work was local and the act
compulsory. Suppose on the other hand that the work bears a
direct relation to navigation and commerce, as in the case of
" 240 N. Y. 292, 148 N. E. 527 (1925). For further statement of the
views of the New York court, see Danielsen v. Morse Dry Dock & lepair
Co., 235 N. Y. 439, 139 N. E. 567 (1923), ccrt. denied, 262 U. S. 756, 43
Sup. Ct. 703 (1923).
?-5 State Industrial Board v. Terry & Tench Co., Inc., 273 U. S. 639, 47
Sup. Ct. 90 (1926). Decisions of state courts to the same effect are:
Zahler v. Dept. of Labor and Industries, 125 Wash. 410, 217 Pac. 55 (1923);
Los Angeles Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Industrial Accident Com-
mission, 57 Cal. App. 352, 207 Pac. 416 (1922).
44 For a discussion of this aspect of the Lahti case see Note (1027) 40
EL-v. L. Rm'. 435.
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stevedoring, but the compensation act is of the optional type and
the parties elect to come under it. Does the Rohde opinion jus-
tify the conclusion that the local statute may be applied? It has
been supposed by a few state courts that an affirmative answer
should be given.4' There is little probability, however, that this
view would be approved by the Supreme Court, and the greater
number of state courts have held to the contrary.8 The Lahti
decision indicates that the nature of the employment is the de-
cisive factor. And if characteristic features of the maritime law
are involved in the rights of stevedores injured on the water,
those features are prejudiced when they are superseded by an
exclusive state law, whether the parties have so elected or not.
The application of local compensation acts under these conditions
would constitute a serious inroad upon the requirement of uni-
formity, since uniformity could be destroyed with respect to any
maritime employment wherever the statute was of the optional
type. Certainly the parties cannot by their own choice, with or
without state sanction, secure to state tribunals a jurisdiction
which it is beyond the power of Congress to bestow.
It is equally unlikely that the requirement of uniformity can
be evaded by means of the clause added in 1922 to the workmen's
compensation act of New York,4 which provides that awards
thereunder may be made in respect of injuries subject to
admiralty or other federal laws in case the parties waive their
admiralty or interstate commerce rights and remedies."
1' Rickert v. Industrial Accident Commission, 122 Ore. 565, 259 Pac. 205
(1927); West v. Kozer, 104 Ore. 94, 206 Pac. 542 (1922); Span v. John
Baizley Iron Works, Am. Mar. Cas. 1351 (Pa. Super. 1928); Berry v.
M. F. Donovan & Sons, 120 Me. 457, 115 Atl. 250 (1921); see State v.
W. C. Dawson & Co., 122 Wash. 572, 580, 211 Pac. 724, 726 (1922). But
see Zahler v. Dept. of Labor and Industries, supra note 45, at 426, 217 Pac.
at 60.
48 March v. Vulcan Iron Works, 102 N. J. L. 337, 132 At]. 89 (1926),
cert. denied, 271 U. S. 682, 46 Sup. Ct. 632; Leszczymski v. Andrew Radel
Oyster Co., 102 Conn. 511, 129 Atl. 539 (1925); Lee v. Licking Valley Coal
Digger Co., 209 Ky. 780, 273 S. W. 542 (1925); Bell v. Southern Casualty
Co., 267 S. W. 531 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924); State v. Duffy, 113 Ohio St.
579, 149 N. E. 870 (1925) ; see also the earlier cases cited in Note (1923)
25 A. L. R. 1029, 1032.
Perhaps the question is foreclosed by Peters v. Veasey, 251 U. S. 121,
40 Sup. Ct. 65 (1919). There it was held that the workmen's compensation
law of Louisiana could not be applied to a longshoreman injured on navi-
gable waters. The act was of the elective type, but this feature of the
case was not noticed in the opinion, which merely followed the authority
of the Jensen case and was of course written prior to the decision in Grant
Smith-Porter Co. v. Rohde.
49 N. Y. Laws 1922, c. 615, § 113.
50 See Christensen v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 216 App. Div. 274,
214 N. Y. Supp. 732 (2d Dep't 1926), appeal dismissed, 243 N. Y. 587, 154
N. E. 616 (19-26).
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The result of this discussion is that the decision in Grant
Smith-Porter Co. v. Rohde rests to no extent upon the type of
compensation statute. Whether or not the local law may be ap-
plied to a harbor worker injured upon navigable waters depends
solely upon whether his employment and activities have a direct
or an indirect relation to navigation and commerce. This is a
question which it is not always easy to determine. No more
detailed a test can be formulated. The distinction is merely one
of degree, and where the line falls can be determined only as it
is charted by the decisions of the Supreme Court. Its position
may be fixed with a fair degree of clarity by a review of the
cases decided up to the present time. Stevedoring of course
bears a direct relation to navigation and commerce, as the JcAnscn
and Dawsoa cases have established. Similarly, in Grcat Lakcs
Dredge & Dock Co. v. Kiercjewski;L and Gonzsalcs v. Morse
Dry Dock & Repair Co., 2 the Supreme Court held that uniform-
ity is required as to the rights of a workman employed under a
maritime contract in the repair of a vessel. It seems equally
plain that employment under a non-maritime contract, as in the
ship-construction involved in the Rohde case, falls on the other
side of the line.
The next case in which the Rohde decision was followed by the
Supreme Court was Millers' ITdemniy Undcrwritcrs v. Braad.
Here the employee was a diver who was killed while submerged
from a floating barge anchored in a river and engaged in sawing
off the timbers of an abandoned set of ways, which had become
an obstruction to navigation. It was held that his employment
had no direct relation to navigation or commerce and that the
state compensation act could apply. The opinion contains no
mention of whether the contract here was maritime or non-
maritime, although the point was open to possible doubt.' There
was, however, no need of discussing the matter. The basis of
the Rohde doctrine is not jurisdictional, but it rests upon the
absence of undue prejudice to the characteristic features and
proper uniformity of the general maritime law. Even a mari-
time contract might be primarily of local rather than general
concern. Certainly this was so as to the employn .ent of the
diver in the Brau.d case.
In Rosengrant v. Harvard 5 the injured man was employed as
a lumber inspector and checker. At the time of injury he was
sitting on a moored vessel tallying lumber, which was being
51 261 U. S. 479, 43 Sup. Ct. 418 (1923).
52266 U. S. 171, 45 Sup. Ct. 39 (1924).
u270 U. S. 59, 46 Sup. Ct. 194 (1926).
5Gf. De Gaetano v. Merritt & Chapman Co., 203 App. Div. 259, 196
N. Y. Supp. 573 (3d Dep't 1922); see also Colonna's Shipyard, Inc. V.
Lowe, 22 F. (2d) 843, 844 (E. D. Va. 1927).
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removed from a barge alongside. It was held by the Supreme
Court of Alabama that this work, which could just as well have
been done on land, was local in character, and that the employ-
ment was governed by the state compensation act. This holding
was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in a memo-
randum decision. In Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Industrial Acci-
dent Commission 56 the employee was engaged to go to Alaska
as a seaman on a fishing vessel and, after arriving at a cannery
there, to go ashore and work as directed. He was injured there
while standing on the shore endeavoring to push into navigable
water a stranded boat. The latter had theretofore been used for
taking fish, but the fishing season had ended and the immediate
purpose was to float the boat to the dock nearby in order that
she might be lifted thereon and stored for the winter. It was
contended by counsel that at the time of the injury the man was
acting as a seaman. Had this been the fact, it would have been
necessary to decide the question discussed earlier in this article
as to the status of a seaman injured on land. As the Court
viewed the case, however, he was engaged at the time in question
not as a seaman, but in land labor in connection with the canning
operations. This being so, it is plain, as the Court held, that his
activities were merely local in character. Even if the work had
been directly concerned with navigation the injury took place
on land and the state law would apply under the authority of
the Nordenholt case.
The latest of this series of cases to be decided by the Supreme
Court is Sultan Railway & Timber Co. v. Department of Labor
and Industries.57  Certain employees were engaged in logging
operations, their duties consisting in putting sawlogs into booms,
after they had been thrown into a river, so that they could con-
veniently be towed elsewhere; other men were employed in tak-
ing apart the booms after they had been transported. None of
them participated in the actual work of transportation. It was
held that such activities bore no more than an incidental relation
to navigation and commerce, and that the local law controlled.
These decisions give a general indication of how far state
compensation laws may be applied to injuries occurring upon
navigable waters. Broadly speaking, the material factors may
be reduced to one. Such circumstances as the nationality of the
vessel concerned or the residence of her owners appear to be
indecisive. Nor does it seem to be important whether or not
interstate or foreign commerce is involved. 8 The result depends
55 273 U. S. 664, 47 Sup. Ct. 454 (1927), aff'g 213 Ala. 202, 104 So.
409 (1925).
:6 48 Sup. Ct. 346 (U. S. 1928).
57 48 Sup. Ct. 505 (U. S. 1928).
Gs But see Spitzer v. The Annette Rolph, 110 Ore. 461, 474, 223 Pac. 253,
256 (1924).
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solely upon the closeness of the relationship betveen the em-
ployment in question and navigation or commerce in general
upon navigable waters. Upon this basis it seems fairly clear
that the cases just reviewed have been correctly decided.
Other cases, however, which have not been reviewed by the
Supreme Court, have involved more difficulty. And the great
variety of circumstances involved in the varying transactions
that occur make for many close cases, to which the general test
cannot be applied with confidence in the advance of court ac-
tion.59 This difficulty of application to new cases constitutes a
major objection to the Rolide doctrine, as compared with the
more natural classification into seamen on the one hand and
harbor workers on the other. It is a difficulty which has not
arisen in the older situations, in which state laws of other sorts
have been applied within maritime jurisdiction. This trouble
will be diminished, of course, as the line of demarcation is more
closely drawn by future decisions; and the further charting of
this line (together with the determination of the status of a
seaman injured on land in the course of his employment) con-
stitutes the principal matter remaining to be worked out with
regard to the application of state compensation laws to maritime
injuries.
THE FEDERAL COMPENSATION ACT
The requirement of uniformity, as established by the Jc. scn
and subsequent cases, has never met with the approval of Con-
gress. In the Acts of 1917 and 1922 that body attempted to
control the matter by giving to the state compensation acts a
scope larger than that permitted by the Supreme Court. Such
power being denied it, only one method remained of securing
to maritime workers, beyond the limited field left to the state
laws by the Rohide doctrine, the benefits of workmien's compensa-
tion. That was of course through the passage of a federal com-
pensation act which should be geographically uniform in its
operation. As to the scope of such an act, some choice was left
to Congress. The law might be made to apply up to the extreme
ss Cases illustrative of the difficulty encountered by the courts in apply-
ing the test established by the Rohde decision are: Zurich Co. v. Industrial
Accident Commission, 191 Cal. 770, 213 Pac. 563 (1923), ccrt. dcnied, 20
U. S. 722, 44 Sup. Ct. 230 (1924); Southern Surety Co. v. Crawford, 274 S.
W. 280 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925), cert. denied, 270 U. S. 655, 4G Sup. Ct. 053
(1925); City of Oakland v. Industrial Accident Commission, 198 Cal. 273,
244 Pac. 353 (1926); McNamara v. McHarg-Barton Co., 200 App. Div.
188, 192 N. Y. Supp. 743 (3d Dep't 1922); Jones v. Crescent City Ice
Mfg. Co., 162 La. 151, 110 So. 182 (1926); Johnson v. Swonder, 84 Ind.
App. 155, 150 N. E. 615 (1926); London Guarantee Co. v. Industrial
Accident Commission, 265 Pac. 825 (Cal. 192S); Travelers Insurance Co.
v. Bacon, 30 Ga. App. 728, 119 S. E. 458 (1923) ; Beyerle v. Industrial Ac-
cident Commission, 75 Cal. App. 19, 241 Pac. 894 (1925)..
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limits of admiralty jurisdiction (thus raising the questions
discussed earlier in this article as to just what those limits are
with respect to workmen's compensation). Or the law might
cover only the field within which uniformity is required, leaving
to state legislation the fullest permissible scope. In view of the
favor with which Congress had previously viewed the application
of the state acts in this field, it was to be expected that it should
adopt the second alternative. This was done in the passage of
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act in
1927.60 Section 3 of this Act, relating to coverage, reads as
follows:
"(a) Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in
respect of disability or death of an employee, but only if the
disability or death results from an injury occurring upon the
navigable waters of the United States (including any dry dock)
and if recovery for the disability or death through workmen's
compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by State
law. No compensation shall be payable in respect of the dis-
ability or death of-
"(1) A master or member of a crew of any vessel, nor any
person engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any
small vessel under eighteen tons net; or
"(2) An officer or employee of the United States or any
agency thereof or of any State or foreign government, or of
any political subdivision thereof.
"(b) No compensation shall be payable if the injury was
occasioned solely by the intoxication of the employee or by the
willful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself or
another."
It seems clear that the provision for the payment of compen-
sation, only if recovery for the disability through workmen's
compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by state
law, is intended to leave the state acts in full possession
of the field open to them under the constitutional decisions of
the Supreme Court. Hence the federal Act does not apply to
any case within the scope of the Nordenholt and Rohde decisions,
and the doctrine of the latter becomes the primary test of its
application. The question is not whether the state concerned
actually has a compensation law, but whether, if it had, such
law could constitutionally be applied. The further limitation
of the Act to injuries occurring upon navigable waters adds no
more, 61 since under the Nordenholt case harbor workers injured
60 44 STAT. 1424 (1927), 33 U. S. C. §§ 901-950 (1926). For a discussion
of the Act, see (1928) 28 CoL. L. REV. 88.
61 The inclusion within the term "navigable waters" of "any dry dock,"
although open to theoretical objection so far as docks permanently attached
to the land are concerned, is supported by authority. The Robert W. Par-
sons, 191 U. S. 17, 24 Sup. Ct. 8 (1903).; The Anglo-Patagonian, 235
Fed. 92 (C. C. A. 4th, 1916), cert. denied, 242 U. S. 636, 37 Sup. Ct. 19
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on land in the course of maritime employment may validly be
subjected to state law. So far as seamen are concerned, they
are expressly excluded from the operation of the Act. Worlkers
of this class are left to their rights under the maritime law,
together with the right given them by the Jones Act c2 to main-
tain at their election an action under the federal Employers'
Liability Act applicable to railway employees.
A clause of doubtful expediency is that excluding from the
operation of the Compensation Act "any persons engaged by the
master to load or unload any small vessel under 18 tons net."
There is nothing in the opinions of the Supreme Court to indi-
cate that the requirement of uniformity, which normally applies
to the work of loading or unloading vessels, may be limited ac-
cording to the size of the craft. Unless some such limitation is
to be made, such workers could not be protected by a state com-
pensation act. Being expressly excluded from the federal Act,
the benefits of workmen's compensation appear to be wholly de-
nied to them. While the rights given seamen by the Jones Act
might perhaps be extended to them, ' it is questionable whether
there is sufficient justification for separating them from other
harbor workers.
In addition to the provisions of section 3 quoted abbve, a
further clause relating to the scope of the Act is found in sub-
division 4 of section 2, where the term "employer" is defined as
"an employer any of whose employees are employed in maritime
employment, in whole or in part, upon the navigable waters of
the United States (including any dry dock)." Generally speak-
ing, employment which is "maritime" will also bear a direct re-
lation to navigation or commerce, and so, if the injury occurs on
navigable waters, recovery "through workmen's compensation
proceedings may not validly be provided by State law." Hence
the scope of the Act as defined by this phrase in section 2 will
normally coincide with that .fixed by the latter provision con-
tained in section 3. If there is any difference in meaning be-
tween the two clauses, however, that in section 2 would appear
to be the broader. In any case where the employment bore a
direct relation to navigation or commerce, so that state law
could not constitutionally be applied, such employment would
(1916); Butler v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., 240 N. Y. 23, 1417 N. E.
235 (1925); O'Hara's Case, 243 Mlass. 31, 142 N. E. 344 (1924). But "dry
dock" does not include a marine railway. Colonna's Shipyard, Inc. v. Lowe,
supra note 54.
6241 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U. S. C. § 6S (1926).
63 See International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U. S. 50, 47 Sup.
Ct. 19 (1926), holding that longshoremen are "seamene within the mean-
ing of the Jones Act. Except for persons engaged by the mast-er to load
or unload vessels under 18 tons net, the remedy extended to stevedores by
this decision is superseded by the federal Compensation Act.
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have to be "maritime." On the other hand it is possible that
some employment might be "maritime" and yet bear a relation
to navigation and commerce which would be sufficiently indirect
to permit the application of state law. In such event the extent
of the two clauses would not be the same and it would be neces-
sary to determine which will control. It seems probable that it
was the intention of Congress, in harmony with its previous atti-
tude upon the subject, to leave to the state laws the fullest per-
missible scope. Therefore the general term "maritime employ-
ment" should be limited by the specific requirement of section 3
to the effect that compensation shall be payable only if recovery
through workmen's compensation proceedings may not validly
be provided by state law. There are as yet no decisions upon
the point.64
On the whole the interpretation of the Longshoremen's Act
should not involve great difficulty. It will be necessary to draw
the line between seamen and harbor workers, but this is a
familiar distinction in the maritime law. The major problem
will be the continued application of the doctrine of Grant Smith-
Porter Co. v Rohde.65 It may seem unfortunate that the test
laid down by that case should have been perpetuated by federal
legislation. But Congress followed an understandable policy in
preserving for local workers such rights as could constitutionally
be given them under state compensation acts. And the limits
fixed for the Longshoremen's Act are probably as workable as
any that Congress could have devised. In fact it does not seem
an exaggeration to say that the doctrine of uniformity, as it has
been developed by the Supreme Court, has made impossible the
drawing of any line of demarcation between state and federal
compensation acts, which would be satisfactory in its practical
operation. The classification which has the advantage of prac-
tical desirability, both in its social consequences and in ease of
application, is that into seamen and harbor workers. Had Stdte
of Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co.0 been decided the other
way, the most satisfactory solution of the whole problem would
have been reached. But such a solution has been denied and
local uniformity in the rights of local employees has been sacri-
ficed in order that geographical uniformity might be made secure.
And to what end? In a large proportion of cases the only gain
to the employer has been that he must now ingure under two
compensation acts instead of one.
04For the views of the United States Employees' Compensation Com-
mission, to which the administration of the Act is intrusted, see Longshore-
men's Act, Opinion No. 2, Am. Mar. Cas. 1552 (1927); Longshoremen's
Act, Opinion No. 30, Am. Mar. Cas. 417 (1928).
a5 Supra note 38.6oSupra note 18.
